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SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AND THE WAR




Our criminal justice system is founded upon a belief that one is innocent until
proven guilty. This belief is what foists the burden of proving a person’s guilt upon
the government and belies a statutory presumption in favor of allowing a defendant
to remain free pending trial at the federal level. Though there are certainly circum-
stances in which a federal magistrate judge may—and sometimes must—remand a
defendant to jail pending trial, it is well-settled that pretrial detention itself inher-
ently prejudices the quality of a person’s defense. In some cases, a defendant’s
pretrial conditions become so onerous that they become punitive and even burden
his or her constitutional rights, including the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to
due process and the effective assistance of counsel, respectively. Special Administra-
tive Measures (SAMs) consist of a variety of confinement conditions that the attor-
ney general may impose on an individual defendant at his or her discretion. Their
purpose is to severely restrict communication by defendants with the demonstrated
capacity to endanger the public through their third-party contacts. Although Con-
gress did not create SAMs with terrorists in mind, their use in terrorism cases is
almost routine. This Note explores the constitutional implications of SAMs when
they are imposed on terrorism defendants who are detained pending trial. Specifi-
cally, my interview with criminal defense attorney Joshua Dratel sheds critical light
on the deleterious impact SAMs have on a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to
due process and Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
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INTRODUCTION
  On June 6, 2006, Syed Fahad Hashmi was arrested at London’s
Heathrow airport.1 He was en route to Pakistan when British law enforce-
ment officials detained him under the authority of a U.S. arrest warrant.
An American citizen, Hashmi was charged with two counts of providing
and conspiring to provide material support to Al Qaeda, as well as two
counts of making and conspiring to make a contribution of goods or ser-
vices to Al Qaeda. When he first appeared before Judge Loretta A. Preska,
the chief judge of the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, to ask for bail, Hashmi lacked a criminal history and
enjoyed substantial ties to New York City; he grew up in Queens.
Nevertheless, Judge Preska denied Hashmi’s request for bail. The
friends and family who packed the courtroom on Hashmi’s behalf sat in
disbelief, but continued to support him. Initially, there was nothing partic-
ularly outstanding or unique about the circumstances of Hashmi’s pretrial
detention. Hashmi’s lawyer was able to meet with him regularly and speak
with others freely. Hashmi was allowed to visit with his friends and family,
and his family members were allowed to discuss their visits. Hashmi had a
radio in his cell, enjoyed regular access to the newspaper and other publi-
cations, and was even able to shower outside of a camera’s view.
Then, five months after Judge Preska denied Hashmi bail, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons (BOP)—at Attorney General Eric Holder’s behest—
1. The following facts are taken from Jeanne Theoharis, My Student, ‘The Terrorist’,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 3, 2011), https://chronicle.com/article/My-Student-the-Ter-
rorist/126937/.
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imposed Special Administrative Measures (SAMs) on Hashmi, which
placed him under twenty-three-hour lockdown and restricted his access to
family, friends, and the media. The specifics of Hashmi’s SAMs were
nothing short of draconian. Hashmi was unable to communicate with any-
one except his attorney and, in a severely limited fashion, his family. He
received no more calls or letters; Hashmi could not even talk through his
cell’s walls because they were electronically monitored. Under the SAMs,
Hashmi had to shower and relieve himself in the presence of cameras, and
he was only allowed to write one letter per week, not more than three
pages long, to a single member of his family.
Even though one of Hashmi’s parents could technically visit their son
once every other week, the visits were often not allowed to happen or
were cut short for bureaucratic reasons. Hashmi was also unable to com-
municate with the news media at all. He could only access portions of
newspapers approved by the BOP, and he had to wait thirty days after they
were published before he could read them. Hashmi was forbidden from
listening to a radio or from watching television. Denied access to fresh air
or sunlight, Hashmi was allowed one hour of physical activity each day in a
cage located within the Metropolitan Correctional Facility in Manhattan.
This was only permitted after participating in a full strip search.
* *
U.S. law authorizes the attorney general to impose SAMs on defend-
ants in cases where there exists “a substantial risk that a prisoner’s commu-
nications or contacts with persons could result in death or serious bodily
injury to persons, or substantial damage to property that would entail the
risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons.”2 According to the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ), certain inmates are placed under SAMs and
exposed to extreme restrictions on third-party communications in order to
prevent acts of terrorism, violence, or the disclosure of classified informa-
tion.3 Although the Federal government has not released up-to-date details
and statistics on its application of SAMs, it appears that extreme detention
measures are becoming more commonplace in terrorism prosecutions. Ac-
cording to the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), “Just as states
such as California have used overly broad, exaggerated responses to the
development of prison gangs or violence within prison to keep thousands
of prisoners in inhumane prolonged solitary confinement, the Federal gov-
ernment routinely imposes extremely harsh forms of solitary confinement
on persons suspected of or convicted of terrorist-related crimes.”4
2. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (2012).
3. Fact Sheet: Prosecuting and Detaining Terror Suspects in the U.S. Criminal Justice System,
DEP’T OF JUST. (June 9, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-564.html
[hereinafter DOJ Factsheet].
4. WRITTEN TESTIMONY OF THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE AMERICAS: THEMATIC HEARING BEFORE THE
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Arabs and Muslims have a significant interest in questioning the Fed-
eral government’s increased use of harsh pretrial detention measures in ter-
rorism cases because they are the focus of a staggering proportion of all
terrorism prosecutions in the United States.5 The DOJ has imposed SAMs
on several Muslim terror defendants who have been detained pretrial, in-
cluding Hashmi.6 Through SAMs, the Federal government is able to effec-
tively keep accused terrorists walled off from society while they await trial.
In Hashmi’s case, by the time he pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy
to provide material support to al-Qaeda, he had spent almost three years in
solitary confinement.7
The overall effect of Hashmi’s pretrial confinement was devastating.
The harm that solitary confinement inflicts on prisoners’ mental and phys-
ical health is well documented. According to recent testimony given by the
CCR before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR), the “symptoms [psychological experts] have commonly found
in prisoners in prolonged solitary confinement may in fact be worse than
they suspect.”8 Prisoners subjected to solitary confinement often experi-
ence a “persistent and heightened state of anxiety, and paranoid and perse-
cutory fears.”9 Prolonged solitary confinement causes severe headaches,
ruminations, irrational anger, violent fantasies, oversensitivity to stimuli,
extreme lethargy, insomnia, confusion, and an impaired capacity to
concentrate.10
While there is robust debate regarding the extent to which prolonged
solitary confinement violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of
cruel and unusual punishment,11 there is a dearth of analysis on whether
extreme pretrial detention measures infringe on a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment right to due process, including the right to participate mean-
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (Mar. 12, 2013), available at http://
www.aclu.org/files/assets/ccr_testimony_to_iachr_for_thematic_hearing_3-12-13.pdf [herein-
after CCR Testimony].
5. DEP’T OF JUSTICE NAT’L SECURITY DIV., INTRODUCTION TO NATIONAL SECURITY
DIVISION STATISTICS ON UNSEALED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND TERRORISM-RELATED
CONVICTIONS (2012), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/doj060612-stats.pdf; see
also INVESTIGATIVE PROJECT ON TERRORISM, 2010 TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN FEDERAL
COURTS (2010), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/misc/626.pdf (ex-
plaining that nearly every terrorism-related prosecution in 2010 involved an Arab or Muslim
defendant, an Islamist organization, or a self-proclaimed Jihadist network).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Abu-Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Hashmi, 621 F. Supp. 2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74 (2d. Cir.
2000).
7. Theoharis, supra note 1.
8. CCR Testimony, supra note 4, at 4.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See generally Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 115 (2009).
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ingfully in his or her own defense, and his or her Sixth Amendment right
to receive effective assistance of counsel. It is widely recognized that pre-
trial detention itself negatively impacts a criminal defendant’s ability to
“prepare for trial,” and complicates “consulting with counsel, searching for
witnesses, investigating details of the [government’s] case against him, and
earning money for legal fees and expenses.”12 However, where pretrial
detention is more oppressive, its collateral consequences on a defendant
become less harmless and more offensive to the Constitution.
The first part of this Note thus addresses preventive pretrial detention
generally and provides background information on SAMs. Specifically,
Part I.A discusses the constitutional framework for preventive pretrial de-
tention. Part I.B then breaks down the mechanics of SAMs, their historical
evolution, and how they function today. Part II next addresses the consti-
tutional implications of imposing SAMs pretrial, and begins with a discus-
sion of the unique obstacles that are inherent to a terrorism prosecution
against Arab and Muslim defendants. The rest of Part II is devoted to an
in-depth analysis of how SAMs work to punish a defendant before convic-
tion, deprive a defendant of his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights, and
make it very difficult for a defendant to enjoy his Sixth Amendment right
to the effective assistance of counsel. Essentially, this Note concludes that
SAMs imposed before trial burden a defendant’s ability to contribute to his
own defense and amount to punishment before conviction in violation of
his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial. Furthermore, because SAMs
substantially impair an attorney’s ability to investigate a case and have a
chilling effect on his or her advocacy, they also violate a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
I. BACKGROUND ON PREVENTIVE PRETRIAL DETENTION AND
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES
A. Preventive Pretrial Detention Generally
The Constitution does not guarantee criminal defendants an absolute
right to bail; rather, it simply proscribes setting excessive bail.13 In the
federal system, there is a general presumption in favor of allowing a crimi-
nal defendant to remain free pending conviction.14 The Bail Reform Act
of 1984 (BRA), however, formally authorizes a judge to detain a defen-
dant pending trial if the judge determines that the defendant poses a dan-
12. Eric D. Blumenson & John J. Barter, Pretrial Release, Bail, and Pretrial Detention, in
MASSACHUSETTS CRIMINAL PRACTICE, ch. 9, § 9.1 (Eric D. Blumenson & Arthur B. Leavens
eds., 4th ed. 2012), available at http://www.suffolk.edu/documents/LawMCP/Ch9Pretrial
ReleaseBailandPretrialDetention.pdf.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”); see also United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.”).
14. DAVID N. ADAIR, JR., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984, at 1
(3d ed. 2006).
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ger to the community or is a flight risk.15 A court may not detain a federal
criminal defendant until after holding a hearing to determine whether
there is a condition or a combination of conditions that will “reasonably
assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community.”16
Although the prosecution typically has the burden to proffer clear
and convincing evidence that an individual is dangerous before he or she
may be detained accordingly,17 the BRA identifies certain crimes that trig-
ger a rebuttable presumption in favor of detention.18 These crimes include
drug offenses carrying a maximum sentence of ten years or more, offenses
involving a “minor victim,” and acts of terrorism.19 An individual accused
of terrorism, for example, must present evidence to the judge that is mate-
rial to the issue of dangerousness in order to rebut the presumption favor-
ing his or her detention.20 If the evidence fails to persuade the judge that
the defendant is not dangerous, then the individual is remanded pending
trial.21
Pretrial detention is considered preventive rather than punitive be-
cause it is designed to protect the community and guarantee the defen-
dant’s presence in court, not to punish him for a crime he allegedly
committed.22 According to the BRA, nothing about pretrial detention
“shall be construed as modifying or limiting the presumption of inno-
cence.”23 As a result, a criminal defendant is still technically presumed in-
nocent until proven guilty even if he or she is detained pending trial.
However, pretrial detention prioritizes protecting society over safeguard-
ing the accused’s liberty interests. Therefore, it is no surprise that, while
pretrial detention is designed to be preventive rather than punitive, it still
punishes the criminal defendant.
For example, even though a pretrial detainee has not been convicted,
he or she is subjected to the same conditions as other criminal convicts and
thus suffers from the social stigma associated with incarceration. Further,
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2008).
16. Id. § 3142(f).
17. Id. § 3142(f)(2)(B). Although the Act does not articulate a standard of proof for a
finding on likelihood to appear, there appears to be a consensus that the standard as to flight risk
is beyond a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Himler, 797 F.2d 156 (3d
Cir. 1986); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Chimurenga,
760 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1985).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3).
19. Id. § 3142(e).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. David Cole, Out of the Shadows: Preventive Detention, Suspected Terrorists, and War, 97
CAL. L. REV. 693 (2009) available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1134&context=californialawreview.
23. ADAIR, supra note 14, at 61; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j).
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according to the American Bar Association’s Pretrial Release Standards,
not only is pretrial remand “harsh and oppressive,” but it also interferes
with a defendant’s ability to defend himself.24 In fact, one of the “most
glaring concern[s] of the pretrial detainee is the large percentage of de-
tainees who are eventually found guilty.”25 Studies conducted after Con-
gress enacted the BRA demonstrated that, in 1987 and 1988, nearly 85
percent of pretrial detainees were eventually convicted.26 A more recent
study conducted in New York City reiterated that a positive correlation
exists between pretrial detention and conviction. In 2008, “59% of cases
with a released defendant ended in conviction, compared to 74% of cases
with a detained defendant” citywide.27
At the federal level, any likelihood that pretrial detainees face an in-
creased risk of criminal conviction might indicate that judges are effectuat-
ing the BRA’s goals by accurately predicting a defendant’s
dangerousness.28 Conversely, the “tendency of pretrial detainees ultimately
to be found guilty may [also] reflect juror bias,” as jurors may infer that
the defendant’s pretrial confinement is indicative of his guilt.29 Either way,
it is clear that pretrial detention has a deleterious impact on a defendant’s
liberty, reputational interests, and the quality of his defense.
In United States v. Salerno,30 the Supreme Court found pretrial deten-
tion constitutional and further explained that, “in appropriate circum-
stances,” the government’s interest in community safety outweighs an
individual’s liberty interests.31 Under the BRA, those “appropriate cir-
cumstances” are presumptively satisfied when an individual is charged with
committing an act of terror. Although solitary confinement existed at the
time the Supreme Court decided Salerno, SAMs were not yet a part of the
attorney general’s repertoire. After Salerno, however, the question remains:
when does the government’s interest in community safety justify imposing
extremely harsh pretrial detention measures on a defendant? Is there some-
thing special about terrorism defendants that necessitates the use of SAMs
24. AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRETRIAL RELEASE 1
(3d ed. 2007), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal_justice_section_
archive/crimjust_standards_pretrialrelease_toc.html.
25. Douglas J. Klein, The Pretrial Detention “Crisis”: The Causes and the Cure, 52 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 281, 293 (1997), available at http://law.wustl.edu/journal/52/306.
pdf.
26. Id.; see also Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of 1984: An
Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15 (1989).
27. MARY T. PHILLIPS, PRETRIAL DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART 2: FELONY
CASES 25 N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC. (2008), available at http://www.cjareports.
org/reports/felonydetention.pdf.
28. Klein, supra note 25, at 293.
29. Id.
30. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
31. Id. at 740.
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before they have even been convicted? In terrorism cases, pretrial detainees
are regularly “held under highly restrictive conditions pursuant to ‘special
administrative measures’ that significantly limit human contact and mobil-
ity.”32 This is especially true for Arab and Muslim terrorism defendants
who are disproportionately subjected to SAMs pretrial.33
B. Special Administrative Measures (SAMs)
The attorney general may authorize the Director of the BOP to im-
pose SAMs after notifying the BOP in writing that he or she has reason to
believe that a prisoner’s third-party communications or contacts pose a
threat of death or serious bodily injury to others.34 Pursuant to 28 C.F.R.
§ 501.3, the attorney general need not notify the BOP that a particular
prisoner’s communications pose a risk in order to satisfy the statute’s noti-
fication requirement. At the attorney general’s direction, either the head of
a federal law enforcement agency, or the head of a U.S. intelligence
agency, may notify the BOP himself that a specific prisoner’s communica-
tions create a substantial risk of death or injury to others.35 Ultimately,
however, the authorization to implement SAMs must come from the at-
torney general.36
SAMs usually “include housing [an] inmate in administrative deten-
tion and/or limiting certain privileges, including, but not limited to, cor-
respondence, visiting, interviews with representatives of the news media,
and use of the telephone” to the extent necessary to protect the public
from violence or terrorism.37 Under SAMs, a prisoner may be forced to
endure administrative detention and restrictions on his “privileges” for “up
to 120 days or, with the approval of the attorney general, a longer period
of time not to exceed one year.”38 The Director of the BOP may renew a
prisoner’s SAMs at the conclusion of the one-year mark after the attorney
general provides additional written notification that the prisoner’s third-
party communications still present a risk of death or serious bodily injury
to others.39
32. Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415, 1475 (2012).
33. Laura Rovner & Jeanne Theoharis, Preferring Order to Justice, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1331,
1370 (2012).
34. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATT’YS, CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL, at 9-24.100 [hereinafter CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL] (quoting 28 C.F.R
§ 501.3), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/
24mcrm.htm. Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs matters of judicial adminis-
tration and Chapter 5 deals with the Bureau of Prisons and the Department of Justice.
35. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 34, at 9-24.100.
36. Id.
37. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (2001).
38. Id. § 501.3(c).
39. Id.
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Typically, either an assistant U.S. attorney or a member of the U.S.
intelligence community will submit a letter to the attorney general re-
questing authorization for the BOP to impose SAMs on a specific pris-
oner.40 The requesting agency’s letter must include a full statement of the
prisoner’s background and “proclivity for violence,” a “discussion of why
special measures should be implemented,” and an explanation of “what
special measures should be imposed” with a “justification for each.”41 Al-
though the prisoner receives a written notification of the SAMs when they
are imposed, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(b) provides that the “notice’s statement as
to the basis [for the SAMs] may be limited in the interest of prison secur-
ity or safety or to protect against acts of violence or terrorism.”42 Thus, the
very rationale behind subjecting a particular prisoner to SAMs—to protect
against acts of violence or terrorism—also functions as the government’s
justification for keeping the factual basis for the SAMs a secret.
Pursuant to the Administrative Remedy Program,43 while it is cer-
tainly possible for a defendant to challenge the specifics of his SAMs in
court, he must exhaust all available administrative remedies through the
BOP before “the Bureau will refer the inmate to the appropriate statuto-
rily-mandated procedures.”44 The most accurate statistics regarding the
government’s use of SAMs are contained in a factsheet published by the
DOJ in June 2009. The statistics reflect the government’s stated commit-
ment to use SAMs only to “prevent acts of terrorism, acts of violence, or
the disclosure of classified information.”45 As of May 22, 2009, “there
were 44 inmates subjected to SAMs within a total federal inmate popula-
tion of more than 205,000.”46 The government imposes SAMs on only a
tiny fraction of the Federal prison population. “Of the 44 inmates subject
to SAMs, 29 were incarcerated on terrorism-related charges, while 11
were incarcerated on violent-crime related charges (gangs, organized
crime, etc.), and four were incarcerated on espionage charges.”47
1. A Defendant’s Demonstrated Reach is a Necessary Condition for
Imposing SAMs
The federal government established SAMs in May 1996 for gang
leaders, organized crime bosses, and other individuals with the demon-
40. CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL, supra note 34, at 9-24.100.
41. Id.
42. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(b) (2001).
43. Id. § 542.10 (“The purpose of the Administrative Remedy Program is to allow an
inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement”).
44. Id.; see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (holding that Congress has
clearly mandated that a Federal inmate exhaust all available administrative remedies, “regardless of
the relief offered through administrative procedures”).
45. DOJ Factsheet, supra note 3.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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strated capacity to pose a threat to the public, especially potential wit-
nesses, from behind bars.48 Despite the fact that 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a)
makes clear that SAMs exist in order to protect the public from acts of
terrorism, SAMs “were not necessarily developed in connection with ter-
rorism cases or defendants.”49 SAMs first appeared in a 1998 prosecution
against Luis Felipe, a notorious gang leader also known as “King Blood.”50
There, the court rejected Felipe’s challenges to the government’s “special”
conditions of confinement at sentencing because Felipe had demonstrated
his willingness and capacity to continue illegal activities while incarcer-
ated.51 While in prison, Felipe ordered his underlings to commit at least
six murders that resulted in several deaths and injured numerous bystand-
ers.52 The court found that the government’s interest in protecting the
community from a career gangster outweighed any concerns Felipe’s bur-
densome confinement conditions generated.53
Even a cursory reading of the Second Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Felipe clearly indicates that the government placed King Blood
under SAMs because he communicated with third parties from within
prison in order to kill, intimidate, and extort.54 According to the Second
Circuit, “[f]rom his jail cell, Felipe committed the very crimes for which
he is now serving a life sentence. And, until shown differently, we agree
with the district court’s observation that, given the opportunity, [Felipe]
would likely continue such illegal activity.”55
It is important to note that in deciding whether Felipe’s SAMs were
justified, the scope of the court’s inquiry was limited to an examination of
Felipe’s behavior in prison. The court did not justify keeping Felipe under
SAMs simply because he demonstrated a general penchant for violence as a
gang leader. Rather, Felipe’s SAMs were a direct consequence of the es-
tablished and verifiable danger Felipe’s third-party communications created
for the public. The fact that the government’s reasons for maintaining the
SAMs were concrete and not speculative was critical to the Second Cir-
cuit’s decision to affirm the district court.
48. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 33, at 1366–67.
49. Joshua Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and Security Im-
pair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 81, 84 (2003).
50. Id. at 84–85; United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1998).
51. Felipe, 148 F.3d at 110.
52. Id. at 111.
53. Id.
54. Heena Musabji & Christina Abraham, The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effect on
Muslims in America, 1 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 83, 104 (2007).
55. Felipe, 148 F.3d at 111.
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2. The Government’s Interest in Imposing SAMs on Terrorism
Defendants is Specific to the Individual Defendant’s Circumstances
The Second Circuit upheld Felipe’s SAMs because he actually tried
to intimidate witnesses and coordinate murders while incarcerated; the
government could not justify the SAMs based simply on the premise that
Felipe was a notorious gangster. If the attorney general decides that SAMs
are appropriate, they must be “prisoner specific; that is, each prisoner
upon whom SAMs are imposed has a set of SAMs issued for him, and him
alone, based on the circumstances of his case.”56
Where a terrorism defendant has the requisite “demonstrated reach”
to abuse third-party communications but lacks a history of doing so, the
government certainly has an interest in restricting his or her communica-
tions. The DOJ and the BOP are well aware of the risks created by al-
lowing terrorism defendants with alleged ties to terror organizations the
same third-party communication privileges as other inmates.57 Thus,
courts recognize that the government’s interest in preventing defendants
with sophisticated international networks and known links to notorious
terrorists is sufficient to justify SAMs even where there is a dearth of evi-
dence that the suspected terrorist has attempted to use third-party commu-
nications—with unconfined co-conspirators or others—to perpetrate or
promote terrorism.58
For example, in a recent memorandum defending his decision to im-
pose SAMs on Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one of the Boston Marathon bombing
suspects, Attorney General Eric Holder clarified how severe restrictions on
a pretrial terrorism defendant’s third-party communications, particularly
with the media, work to keep the public safe from future acts of terror and
violence. Operating under the premise that Tsarnaev has the ability to
“aid, knowingly or inadvertently, in plans that create a substantial risk that
[his] communications or contacts with persons could result in death or
serious bodily injury to persons,” Holder explained that measures limiting
Tsarnaev’s access to the telephone and mail were necessary to prevent
56. United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 92 (D. Mass. 2002).
57. See, e.g., Letter from Assistant U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald to Attorney Michael
Young (Nov. 13, 1998) (“It needs to be candidly recognized up front that these defendants are
not like ‘most persons detained at [Metropolitan Correctional Center]’ to which [Michael
Young’s] letter makes frequent comparison. Unlike ‘most persons detained at MCC . . . each of
the defendants has been closely tied to the activities of the al Qaeda terrorist organization, whose
openly avowed goal is the slaughter of American civilians anywhere in the world they can be
found . . . .”).
58. See United States. v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 81 (2d. Cir. 2000) (“The government
contends the restrictions imposed on El-Hage are reasonably related to the nonpunitive objective
of protecting national security interests. It maintains that the challenged conditions serve the
regulatory purpose of preventing El-Hage from communicating with his unconfined co-conspir-
ators, and thereby from facilitating additional terrorist acts by those co-conspirators . . . [and
the] government has supported these assertions with ample evidence of [El-Hage’s] extensive
terrorist connections”).
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Tsarnaev from arranging “terrorist or criminal activities” and “receiving or
passing along critically timed messages,” respectively.59 Restricting com-
munication, particularly with the media, thus ensures that Tsarnaev, or any
other similarly situated defendant, cannot make statements designed to in-
cite “terrorist, criminal, and/or violent offenses,” and interrupts “commu-
nication patterns [that] the inmate may develop with the outside
world.”60
In defending his decision to subject Tsarnaev to SAMs, Attorney
General Holder conceded that virtually eliminating Tsarnaev’s access to
the media, telephone, and mail “may be an excessive measure except in
the most egregious of circumstances[.]” He nevertheless asserted that such
measures are necessary because of Tsarnaev’s personal circumstances,
namely his past behavior and the “high probability of calls to co-conspira-
tors to arrange terrorist or criminal activities.”61 Assuming that the attor-
ney general considers reliable and competent evidence to determine
whether there is a high probability that a specific terrorism defendant may
abuse third-party communications, the more evidence showing that an ac-
cused terrorist actually enjoys connections to identified terrorists, net-
works, or cells, the more reasonable it becomes to restrict his third-party
communications.
II. PRETRIAL SAMS VIOLATE A DEFENDANT’S FIFTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. Terrorism Cases Not Involving SAMs
Introducing SAMs to the preventive pretrial detention of terror sus-
pects exacerbates certain obstacles endemic to terrorism cases. Even in the
“ordinary” terrorism case, the criminal defense attorney “assumes a unique
role,” as “he is the only person in the justice system whose sole obligation
and loyalty is to the defendant.”62 Although objectivity is necessary while
preparing or analyzing a particular case, a criminal defense attorney’s con-
stitutional “duty is purely subjective: advancing the best interests of the
client.”63 This duty may create tension “in any case in which the crime
charged is nefarious and the defendant is unsympathetic.”64 Accordingly,
“those conflicts that the criminal defense lawyer’s role engenders are mul-
59. Memorandum from Attorney General Eric Holder to Bureau of Prisons Director
Charles E. Samuels, Jr., Origination of Special Administrative Measures Pursuant to 28 C.F.R.
§ 501.3 for Federal Bureau of Prisons Pretrial Inmate Dzhokhar Tsarnaev 16 (Aug. 27, 2013)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Eric Holder].
60. Id. at 17.
61. Id. at 16.
62. Dratel, supra note 49, at 81.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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tiplied exponentially and become substantially more difficult to navigate”
when the defendant is an accused terrorist.65
While it is difficult to identify a specific terrorism prosecution as pro-
totypical or representative of all terrorism cases involving Arab and Muslim
defendants, the infamous “Toledo Terror” plot highlights some of the
more glaring difficulties inherent to terrorism litigation. In United States v.
Amawi, Mohammad Amawi, Marwan El-Hindi, and Wasim Mazloum
were convicted of conspiracy to commit several acts of terrorism.66 Darren
Griffin, a paid informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
made contact with El-Hindi in September 2002 after embedding himself
in Toledo, Ohio’s local Muslim community.67 Griffin recorded each of the
three defendants discussing his desire to be trained in guns, explosives, and
sniper tactics. Additionally, on the only occasion in which the group of
four met face-to-face, he recorded all of the defendants expressing their
desire to be trained in order to kill American soldiers overseas.68 Griffin
was present during all recorded conversations, and the government offered
no evidence of phone calls or e-mails “dealing with the alleged plot among
only the defendants.”69
Despite the fact that none of the defendants in Amawi formally en-
countered SAMs, defending the case was complicated and frustrating.
None of the three defendants had significant previous criminal histories;
however, they all failed to rebut the BRA’s presumption in favor of their
pretrial detention. Normally, remanded criminal defendants in the North-
ern District of Ohio are detained inside of Lucas County Jail because it is
located near the Federal courthouse, and this location helps defendants and
their attorneys access one another with relative ease.70 Amawi, El-Hindi,
and Mazloum, however, were all detained in a Federal prison in Milan,
Michigan, located about forty minutes from Toledo.71 Judge Helmick rep-
resented Wassim Mazloum before his appointment to the Federal bench.
He indicated that simply communicating with Mazloum was arduous.
Scheduling a physical visit with Mazloum required Judge Helmick to
65. Id.
66. United States v. Amawi, 695 F.3d 457, 465 (6th Cir. 2012). Amawi, El-Hindi, and
Mazloum were accused of conspiracy to kill and maim people living outside the United States,
conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists whose goal was to kill U.S. citizens, and
sharing information regarding how to manufacture explosives, destructive devices, and weapons
of mass destruction. Id. at 490–91.
67. Id. at 466–67.
68. Id. at 467.
69. 3 Men in Toledo Terrorism Case Are Sentenced, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://www.toledonewsnow.com/story/11356307/3-men-in-toledo-terrorism-case-are-
sentenced.
70. Interview with James Carr and Jeffrey Helmick, Fed. Dist. Judges for the N. Dist. of
Ohio, in Toledo, Ohio (Nov. 20, 2012) [hereinafter Interview with Judge Carr and Judge
Helmick].
71. Id.
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spend a minimum of eighty minutes in transit to and from Milan.72 Corre-
spondence between Judge Helmick and Mazloum was subject to frequent
delays; with some letters being re-routed and reviewed before they even
made it to Judge Helmick or Mazloum.73
Dennis Terez, the federal public defender for the Northern District
of Ohio, represented Mohammad Amawi. Terez’s contact visits with
Amawi were irregular and occurred inside a special room that was made
partially out of plexi glass, resulting in totally exposed visitation.74 A thick
plexi glass window separated Terez and Amawi during their meetings, and
the room’s construction caused the temperature to be consistently “swel-
tering hot.”75 The conditions made Terez suspicious enough to request an
affidavit from the government to confirm that he was not being followed
or surveilled, and that his phone lines were not tapped.76 The government
never provided Terez with a clear answer to his inquiry.77 Even worse, the
defendants’ onerous confinement conditions made it virtually impossible
for them to examine the evidence against them, because the vast majority
of it was electronic.78 In Amawi’s case, he had so much difficulty review-
ing the government’s electronic discovery that, at one point, the judge
forced the government’s hand and gave each defendant an iPod to listen to
the recordings.79
The government’s treatment of Amawi and his codefendants por-
trayed a presumption of guilt rather than innocence, and it further re-
flected “deep institutional prejudices against Arab and Muslim
Americans.”80 While Terez conceded that his client had behavioral issues
that likely caused the BOP to revoke some of Amawi’s telephone privi-
leges, Terez was adamant that Amawi’s pretrial confinement was based
largely on prejudice, fear, and stereotypes, rather than on a realistic assess-
ment of Amawi’s dangerousness.81
According to Terez, all of the BOP officials who came into contact
with Amawi appreciated that he was not a threat and saw him as a “run-of-
the-mill defendant who happened to be getting a lot of press because of his
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Interview with Dennis Terez, Fed. Defender for the N. Dist. of Ohio, in Ann Arbor,





79. Interview with Dennis Terez, supra note 74.
80. Id. Mohammad Amawi is Palestinian, but he is a dual citizen of Jordan and the United
States. Marwan El-Hindi was born in Jordan, but he is a naturalized U.S. citizen. Wassim
Mazloum is a Lebanese citizen, and he was a permanent resident at the time he was indicted.
81. Id.
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background.”82 Recall that the SAMs function together with the BRA,
since “almost all defendants in terrorism cases are detained pending
trial.”83 Courts treat national security issues as “paramount” in the context
of the dangerousness inquiry, “and this treatment acts as a natural precursor
to and justification for implementation of the [SAMs] against a particular
defendant.”84
In many of the cases where the attorney general has imposed pretrial
SAMs, the defendants not only failed to demonstrate an intention to abuse
third-party communications, but they also arguably lacked the sufficient
third-party contacts to abuse in the first place. Could the same prejudice
that appeared to underlie Amawi’s pretrial confinement conditions also
play a role in the attorney general’s decision to apply SAMs in specific
cases? While it is impossible to know the attorney general’s subjective con-
siderations in imposing SAMs, the fact remains: when applied pretrial,
SAMs punish defendants before they have been convicted and deny them
the opportunity to meaningfully assist in their own defense in contraven-
tion of the Fifth Amendment. Further, SAMs place serious burdens on the
attorney-client relationship and interfere with a defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
B. Pretrial SAMs Violate a Defendant’s Constitutional Rights
1. SAMs Punish a Defendant in Pretrial Detention and Deny Him the
Ability to Assist in His Own Defense,Violating His Fifth
Amendment Right to Due Process and a Fair Trial
Though the Federal government does not publicize accurate and up-
to-date information regarding its use of SAMs, there is no doubt that since
their introduction in 1996, SAMs have been used pretrial in three separate
terrorism cases: United States v. El-Hage;85 United States v. Abu-Ali;86 and
United States v. Hashmi.87 In El-Hage, Wadih El-Hage, a Lebanese national,
was charged with “six conspiracies to kill United States citizens and destroy
United States property abroad, 20 counts of perjury based on his grand
jury testimony, and three counts of false statements.”88 Most of the charges
arose out of El-Hage’s connection to al-Qaeda and its 1998 attacks on
U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, and Tanzania,
respectively.
Ahmad Abu-Ali, a U.S. citizen, was arrested in Saudi Arabia for al-
legedly participating in a local terror cell while studying at the Islamic
82. Id.
83. Dratel, supra note 49, at 84.
84. Id.
85. 213 F.3d 74 (2d. Cir. 2000).
86. 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008).
87. 621 F. Supp. 2d 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
88. El-Hage, 213 F.3d at 77.
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University in Medina.89 Abu-Ali was charged with conspiracy to provide
material support and providing material support to a designated foreign
terrorist organization;90 two counts of providing material support to ter-
rorists;91 contribution of services to, and receiving funds from, al-Qaeda;92
conspiracy to assassinate the President of the United States;93 and conspir-
acy to pirate and destroy aircrafts94 in violation of U.S. law.95
Fahad Hashmi, a native New Yorker, was extradited to the United
States from Britain in May 2007 where he was pursuing a master’s degree
in international relations at London Metropolitan University.96 Hashmi
was charged with “two counts of providing and conspiring to provide ma-
terial support and two counts of making and conspiring to make a contri-
bution of goods or services to al Qaeda.”97 The government’s case against
Hashmi revolved around his relationship with Mohammed Junaid Babar.98
Babar and Hashmi knew each other from New York, and Babar asked to
stay at Hashmi’s London apartment for two weeks in early 2004.99 The
government claimed that Hashmi was aware of Babar’s subsequent trip to
Pakistan to deliver waterproof gear to al-Qaeda operatives and that Hashmi
even let Babar use his phone to “call conspirators in terrorist plots.”100
Like its Fourteenth Amendment’s equivalent, the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause “was intended to guarantee procedural standards ade-
quate and appropriate . . . to protect at all times people charged with or
suspected of crime by those holding positions of power and authority.”101
Specifically, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits punish-
ing a defendant before trial, protects a defendant’s right to contribute to
his own defense, and preserves the privilege against self-incrimination.102
The use of SAMs pretrial in each of the cases described above re-
stricted the defendant’s access to “important information and evidence,”
“the ability to communicate about important information and evidence,”
and deprived the defendant of the opportunity “to prepare and present a
89. Abu-Ali, 528 F.3d at 221.
90. Id. at 225 (under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B).
91. Id. (under U.S.C.A. § 2339B).
92. Id. (under 50 U.S.C. § 1705(a) & 31 C.F.R. § 595.204).
93. Id. (under 18 U.S.C. § 1751).
94. Id. (under 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(4) & 49 U.S.C. § 46502(a)(2)).
95. Id. at 225.
96. Theoharis, supra note 1.
97. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b).
98. Theoharis, supra note 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Chambers v. Florida., 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940).
102. See, e.g., Dratel, supra note 49, at 82; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748
(1987).
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defense consistent with the constitutional mandates” of the Fifth Amend-
ment.103 In a letter to former U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald, one of the
lead prosecutors in El-Hage, attorneys representing El-Hage and his code-
fendants implored Fitzgerald to ease their client’s conditions of
confinement.104
At one point during the more than thirty months El-Hage spent in
pretrial detention, his SAMs included solitary confinement in a window-
less cell, occasional exercise in a completely barren room nicknamed the
“rat cage,” severe restrictions on social contact, a ban on any communica-
tion with other inmates, undefined “others,” and the news media, and
prohibitions on meeting with attorneys in a soundproof room (a courtesy
afforded to all other pretrial detainees in the BOP’s Metropolitan Correc-
tional Center (MCC) in New York City).105
El-Hage’s pretrial confinement conditions may be better understood
when compared to the circumstances of other pretrial detainees at MCC.
For example, where paralegals, experts, and potential witnesses may have
been allowed to communicate with other MCC pretrial detainees to help
them prepare for trial, the SAMs forbade El-Hage from communicating
with his attorneys’ staff, expert witnesses, and other possible witnesses.106
Again, where most persons detained at MCC are permitted to attend co-
defendant meetings to discuss joint legal issues, or when appropriate, to
prepare common defenses, El-Hage was not.107 Lastly, although most per-
sons detained pretrial at MCC are allowed visits without prior written
notification, permitted to speak with more than one visitor at a time, and
are able to enjoy the visits under “contact conditions,” El-Hage was de-
nied most forms of communication with everyone but his spouse and his
attorneys.108
Abu-Ali’s SAMs also consisted of solitary confinement and serious
restrictions on his social contacts, communications with the media, access
to the mail, ability to interact with his attorneys’ paralegals, and his capac-
ity to review the government’s evidence against him.109 Abu-Ali failed to
exhaust all of the available administrative remedies before he challenged his
SAMs in district court, and his Motion for Relief from Conditions of
Confinement failed accordingly.110 Nevertheless, Abu-Ali’s requested re-
103. Dratel, supra note 49, at 103.
104. Letter from Michael Young, Att’y, to Patrick Fitzgerald, former U.S. Att’y (Nov. 5,






109. United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. Va. 2005) (denying Abu-Ali’s
motion for relief from SAMs).
110. Id. at 342.
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lief sheds light on the concrete ways in which the government’s SAMs
denied him the opportunity to exercise his Fifth Amendment right to a
fair trial. In addition to being released from solitary confinement, Abu-Ali
requested that the BOP furnish his cell with a chair and a desk, permit him
to access a laptop computer and portable printer (both provided by the
defense) in order to review the government’s evidence, allow Abu-Ali to
“receive and retain materials from counsel, including CD-ROMS, without
having them inspected, searched, or taken from him,” cease monitoring
phone calls between Abu-Ali and his attorney, and provide him with
“broader access to mass communications, mail, and visitors.”111
In addition to the earlier description of Hashmi’s SAMs, Hashmi also
could not meet with potential expert witnesses without the attorney gen-
eral’s express approval.112 Hashmi was not allowed to leave voicemails for
his attorney, and he was prevented from communicating with any of his
attorney’s representatives if his attorney was not physically present.113
Outside of the occasional correspondence he had with his immediate fam-
ily, the only other mail Hashmi received was subject to BOP determina-
tion that the documents were “relevant to [Hashmi’s] defense.”114
The SAMs imposed on El-Hage, Abu-Ali, and Hashmi forced each
defendant to reveal critical information about his defense strategies to the
prosecution whenever he wanted to meet with a potential witness, speak
with his attorney’s representatives, or even receive mail. The irony of this
situation cannot be overstated: because of the SAMs, the very people who
were seeking a conviction of El-Hage, Abu-Ali, and Hashmi also served as
the gatekeepers to the defense strategies each defendant attempted to con-
struct. Categorical bans on any media contact also significantly impeded
each defendant’s ability to use the court of public opinion to test out de-
fense theories and give meaningful effect to the presumption of innocence.
The fact that these defendants endured extremely similar SAMs con-
ditions makes the SAMs look more like impermissible punishment before
trial. The SAMs imposed on Hashmi, for example, were “in substance
identical to those imposed against [notorious shoe bomber] Richard
Reid.”115 In fact, those SAMs were “in content the same SAMs place
111. United States v. Ali, 396 F. Supp. 703, 704–05 (E.D. Va. 2005) (quoting Abu-Ali’s
Motion for Relief from Conditions of Confinement).
112. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Emergency Hearing to
Prohibit the Attorney General from Restricting Defense Counsel’s Access to Defendant and
Impairing Defendant’s Constitutional Rights at 4, United States v. Hashmi, 621 F. Supp. 2d 76
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 06 Cr. 00442) [hereinafter Hashmi Memorandum on Emergency
Hearing].
113. Id.
114. Id. at 5.
115. Id. at 2.
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upon Zacarias Moussaoui (EDVA), Ahmed Ressam (MDCAL), Ahmed
Omar Abu Ali (EDVA), and Ernest James Ujaama (WDWA).”116
Additionally, the SAMs themselves distracted each defendant from
the actual merits of his case and effectively stopped him from meaningfully
contributing to his own defense. In El-Hage specifically, the SAMs forced
the defendant to become obsessed with ameliorating his pretrial confine-
ment conditions and prevented him from devoting his time and energy to
building a defense. Attorney Joshua Dratel, who helped represent both El-
Hage and Abu-Ali, described a typical encounter with a client under
SAMs in the Southern District of New York:
You go to the MCC with the objective of discussing the case
and making progress towards trial preparation or motion prepa-
ration or whatever you’re doing. When you arrive, and finally
get to your client, you end up spending the first half-hour, if
not longer, discussing pretrial confinement conditions issues,
like access to a new toothbrush or reading materials. While
these concerns are real, they’re distractions from the broader
objective of preparing for the case.117
Not only do the SAMs distract a defendant from the merits of his or
her case and consume precious face-time between client and attorney,
they also put challenging the SAMs the center of an attorney’s attention. It
is very difficult to convince a defendant under SAMs to think about any-
thing but the conditions of his or her pretrial detention, which forces the
attorney to spend even more time challenging the SAMs.118 This includes
“calling the BOP’s legal counsel, the prosecutor, and writing letters to the
judge—all of which are very time consuming and unlikely to yield any
positive results.”119 In Dratel’s experience, it appears that “the government
capitalizes on this situation in a somewhat deliberate way, even though
such a manipulation is certainly not the purpose of the SAMs
themselves.”120
To clarify this point, Dratel emphasized the difference between the
application of SAMs in the prosecution of Luis Felipe and that in El-Hage,
Abu-Ali, and Hashmi. For example, where the SAMs were justified in
Felipe’s case because of his demonstrated ability to pose a danger from
behind bars, SAMs were imposed on Hashmi after he had already spent
170 days in the MCC without any incidents. In fact, the information upon
which Attorney General Holder supposedly relied in determining that
116. Id.
117. Telephone Interview with Joshua Dratel, President, Joshua L. Dratel, P.C. (Jan. 24,
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Hashmi’s communications could result in death or serious bodily injury to
people was Hashmi’s membership in a group called “Al-Muhajiroun,”
Junaid Babar’s use of Hashmi’s cellphone to call a man named Omar
Khyam, and statements Hashmi made when he was detained in London by
British authorities.121 All of this information was known to the U.S. At-
torney’s Office when Hashmi was indicted, and defense counsel received
no information “suggesting a change of circumstances” in any threat
Hashmi posed.122
“Sometimes, the most effective way to communicate with witnesses
is to have the defendant do it, either through a letter of introduction or a
phone call, and the SAMs made that impossible” in El-Hage and Abu-
Ali.123 There is no real substitute for having the defendant himself reach
out to potential witnesses and introduce them to his attorney.124 The fact
that neither El-Hage, Abu-Ali, nor Hashmi were allowed to independently
communicate with third parties based on a thorough and unfettered review
of the evidence against them undermined their capacity to make any real
contributions to their defense.
The SAMs also distract a defendant from the case’s substance and
prevent the accused from concentrating on how to best challenge the in-
dictment, which may include preparing the defendant to testify at trial, a
task requiring “an extraordinary amount of time and attentiveness.”125
The defendant’s isolation only makes matters worse: “[s]ince the attorney
is the only person with whom the client has contact, the attorney is the
only outlet for the client’s frustration.”126 If this itself does not create ten-
sion between the defendant and his attorney, the attorney’s failure to sub-
stantively improve the defendant’s confinement conditions “can be met
with animosity and resistance to discussing anything else,” depriving the
defendant the benefit of his own assistance.127 In Abu-Ali’s case, although
he never expressed distrust towards Dratel, he simply withdrew from the
entire case and “lost affect.”128
Therefore, as the defendant’s paranoia increases, the likelihood that
he will provide “an accurate, complete, or detailed factual account” of the
case’s circumstances diminishes. Given the “complexity of [El-Hage and
Abu-Ali, specifically], the volume of the discovery, the travel involved in
effective investigation, the need to consult and retain experts, and the
length of the trials,” severe restrictions on El-Hage’s and Abu-Ali’s ability
121. Hashmi Memorandum on Emergency Hearing, supra note 112, at 1.
122. Id. at 1–2.
123. Interview with Joshua Dratel, supra note 117.
124. Id.
125. Dratel, supra note 49, at 85.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Interview with Joshua Dratel, supra note 117.
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to communicate with their attorneys, their attorneys’ representatives, and
potentially helpful third parties deprived them of their Fifth Amendment
right to a fair trial.129 Even where the case is less factually complicated and
convoluted, as was the case in Hashmi, the SAMs broke Hashmi’s spirit and
had a strong coercive effect.130 The particularly harsh conditions SAMs
create for a defendant who is detained pretrial may, “whether intentionally
or inadvertently,” pressure him into a plea bargain to which he would not
otherwise agree.131
2. SAMs Drastically Interfere with the Attorney-Client Relationship
and Work to Deny a Defendant in Pretrial Detention the Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Violation of the Sixth Amendment
There are two particularly onerous corollaries of SAMs that bear di-
rectly on the attorney-client relationship. First, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) au-
thorizes the attorney general to eavesdrop on all conversations between an
attorney and his client after SAMs have been imposed.132 Under the stat-
ute, the attorney general may effectively abrogate the attorney-client privi-
lege and create an independent “privilege team” to monitor and sift
through “all communications between the inmate and [his] attorneys.”133
The attorney general must have reasonable suspicion134 that the prisoner is
using communications with his attorney to further acts of violence or ter-
rorism before he begins monitoring their conversations.135
Upon a finding of reasonable suspicion, the statute requires that the
DOJ provide written notice to attorney and client that their conversations
will be monitored.136 Although the notice requirement was designed to
129. Dratel, supra note 49, at 86.
130. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 33, at 1369–70.
131. Id. at 1370 (citing Letter from the Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. Law Sch. to
Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen. 2 (Oct. 20, 2008), available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/301ff4
d661c066cf21_p7m6brynx.pdf).
132. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001) (“In any case where the Attorney General specifically so
orders, based on information from the head of a federal law enforcement or intelligence agency
that reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a particular inmate may use communications with
attorneys or their agents to further or facilitate acts of terrorism, the Director, Bureau of Prisons,
shall, in addition to the special administrative measures imposed . . . provide appropriate proce-
dures for the monitoring or review of communications between that inmate and attorneys or
attorneys’ agents who are traditionally covered by the attorney-client privilege, for the purpose of deter-
ring future acts that could result in death or serious to persons, or substantial damage to property
that would entail the risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons.”) (emphasis added).
133. 29 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2013).
134. Reasonable suspicion is a particularly low standard of proof most frequently invoked
in the scope of temporary investigative “stop-and-frisks” by law enforcement. Reasonable suspi-
cion must be based on specific and articulable facts that give rise to more than a hunch that
criminal activity is afoot. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968).
135. 29 C.F.R. § 501.3(d).
136. § 501.3(d)(2).
436 Michigan Journal of Race & Law [VOL. 19:415
assuage concerns about the monitoring regulation’s constitutionality, it
does not apply to Title III137 or Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act elec-
tronic surveillance of attorney-client conversations.138 Thus, “the fact that
a particular defendant or lawyer has not received notice under the regula-
tion provides, at best, a false sense of security, since that does not preclude
the possibility of clandestine eavesdropping under Title III or FISA.”139
Second, “given the nature and scope of the [SAMs], it is doubtful
that any lawyer could maintain a perfect record of compliance” with all of
the government’s proscriptions.140 However, failure to adhere to the SAMs
may subject an attorney to criminal prosecution because the “government
has maximum discretion regarding whom to prosecute, for what conduct,
and when.”141 The prosecution of attorney Lynne Stewart, who repre-
sented an accused terrorist, remains the quintessential example of how the
government can use SAMs to expose someone to massive criminal liability
“out of noncompliance in a matter that suits [its] policy.”142
In 2005, Stewart was convicted of five counts of conspiracy to pro-
vide material support for terrorists and making false statements.143 The
charges arose out of Stewart’s violation of the SAMs imposed on Sheikh
Omar Abdel Rahman (also known as the “Blind Sheikh”). In 2000, Stew-
art “made a statement to the press about [Abdel Rahman’s] thoughts on
the Egyptian ceasefire while serving as his counsel.”144 Stewart’s statement
constituted unauthorized contact between Abdel Rahman and the media
in contravention of Abdel Rahman’s SAMs, and the Clinton Administra-
tion reprimanded her for the violation without imposing any formal crim-
inal charges.145 However, in the spring of 2002—and under an arguably
much different political climate—former Attorney General John Ashcroft
indicted Stewart on several charges of conspiring to provide material sup-
port for terrorism, all of which flowed from Stewart’s violation of Abdel
Rahman’s SAMs.146
137. The Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (formerly known as the “Title III” Wiretap Act).
138. Dratel, supra note 49, at 89.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 88.
141. Id. (emphasis omitted).
142. Id.
143. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 33, at 1373.
144. Id. at 1373–74.
145. Id.; see also Abbe Smith, The Bounds of Zeal in Criminal Defense: Some Thoughts on
Lynne Stewart, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 31, 34 (2002).
146. United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 98–100, 108 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming Stew-
art’s convictions of “conspiring to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371”;
“providing and concealing material support to the conspiracy to murder persons in a foreign
country in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and of conspiring to provide and
conceal such support in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371”; and of “knowingly and willfully making
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For Stewart, actions that initially culminated in a stern reprimand
from the DOJ under President Bill Clinton later substantiated serious
criminal charges against her under President George W. Bush. Lynne
Stewart’s case is significant because it “provides a cautionary tale for con-
travening these rules.”147 Terrorism prosecutions already involve higher
stakes than other “ordinary” criminal cases.148 When applied pretrial,
SAMs can make an attorney who zealously advocates for his or her client
vulnerable to prosecution if the attorney general decides that the attorney’s
behavior jeopardizes national security.
The United States Supreme Court “has recognized that the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”149 In Strickland,
the Court delineated a two-part test to evaluate claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel by assessing counsel’s deficient performance, and the re-
sulting prejudice to the defense.150 The inquiry is retrospective, meaning
that a reviewing court looks at the trial record to determine whether
counsel’s performance failed to meet an objective standard of reasonable-
ness and whether any deficiencies in counsel’s performance prejudiced the
client.151 A reviewing court will show deference to a defense counsel’s case
strategy when it reflects an independent examination into the facts, which
specifically includes “pursuing all leads relevant to the merits of the
case.”152 Counsel’s deficient performance prejudices his client when it de-
prives him of a substantial defense or when the reviewing court determines
that but for counsel’s deficient performance, there was a reasonable
probability of a different outcome to the case.153
For the attorney who has litigated terrorism cases in which his client
was subjected to SAMs pretrial, there is little doubt that the SAMs “signifi-
cantly impair counsel’s ability to investigate the case adequately,” thus
preventing them from pursuing all leads relevant to the case’s merits. The
SAMs in El-Hage, Abu-Ali, and Hashmi prevented each defendant from
false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 when she affirmed that she intended to, and
would, abide by the SAMs”).
147. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 33, at 1373.
148. Dratel, supra note 49, at 82 (“In cases involving terrorism, the stakes are, of course,
potentially far more significant than in the ordinary case. The allegations . . . do not suggest
discrete harm, but rather a threat to entire populations and to civic security as a whole. The
attorney himself may be within the defined class of victims––i.e., “all Americans around the
world”—whom the defendant is alleged to have targeted. Moreover, while it is frequently easy
enough to rationalize vindicating the statutory and constitutional rights of a defendant who . . .
[allegedly] committed morally repugnant criminal offenses . . . even the criminal defense lawyer
is presented with competing considerations when his client is not just a criminal defendant, but
also an alien (or naturalized citizen) officially designated as the ‘enemy’ in an armed conflict.”).
149. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (internal citations omitted).
150. Id. at 687.
151. Id. at 688–89.
152. Blackburn v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1987).
153. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38–39 (2009).
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aiding his counsel’s investigation “by contacting sources and encouraging
them to cooperate with counsel,” and as a result, the attorneys in those
cases were unable to discover, or meaningfully utilize, potentially exculpa-
tory evidence that may have existed.154 Admittedly, the prejudice a defen-
dant faces from his inability to communicate with third parties in
preparing his defense is speculative; it is impossible to know if such third-
party communications would have actually rendered useful or potentially
exculpatory evidence.
However, effects of SAMs on an attorney’s capacity to provide zeal-
ous and effective representation undoubtedly prejudice defendants. Specif-
ically, even if an attorney commits a slight violation of the SAMs by
communicating with third parties in the scope of his investigation, he sub-
jects himself to an indictment because he failed to comply with the SAMs
“attorney certification,” which calls on an attorney to formally acknowl-
edge the SAMs and pledge to abide by them.155 Tying the threat of crimi-
nal prosecution to an attorney’s advocacy on his or her client’s behalf may
have a strong chilling effect on counsel’s advocacy, particularly after Lynne
Stewart’s prosecution and conviction. Because violating SAMs is a “spe-
cific-intent” offense, “the question is willfulness, and the government has
the power to decide to whom it wishes to afford the benefit of the doubt”
and to whom it will not.156 Dratel’s explanation is particularly telling:
I do think that [SAMs] have a chilling effect generally, and for
those of us involved with terrorism cases on a day-to-day basis,
we have incorporated some of these precautions into the way
we operate, which is not a good thing because you end up self-
censoring on the wrong side of the “line” that the SAMs draw.
In other words, I’m always trying to be careful. This is a visual
example, but if the SAMs draw a line between illegal conduct
and what would otherwise be zealous criminal advocacy, I
don’t want to cross that line and subject myself to criminal
prosecution. I am not going to go near that line, because I’m
not sure what actions will cause my courtroom adversaries to
file criminal charges against me. So, this ‘buffer zone’ is created
between the line I draw for myself out of self-preservation and
the arbitrary line drawn by the SAMs, and this is where the
client suffers the most. Essentially, the government’s enforce-
ment of the SAMs is vague; there is no objective “bright-line.”
I once took a course in college on totalitarianism, and one
thing I remember is that totalitarian regimes profit by vague
enforcement of their laws, because then nobody knows when
154. Dratel, supra note 49, at 86–87.
155. Id. at 89.
156. Id. at 88.
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they’re protected and when they’re not, so people will always
be on guard and will self-censor and enforce.157
To hear Dratel equate the government’s use of SAMs pretrial with
the tools totalitarian regimes employ to sustain their own power is dis-
turbing. The fact that the attorney general may also monitor otherwise
privileged attorney-client communications makes the chilling effect more
acute. The monitoring regulation “makes the defense attorney presump-
tively suspect” and significantly decreases the chances that the defendant
and his client will engage in the “candid exchange” of information that is
otherwise customary.158 Maintaining a free-flow of information between
an attorney and his client is especially important in terrorism cases, where,
“more often than not, [cases] involve evidence and information related to
communities and countries to which counsel may lack access or sufficient
knowledge without input and assistance from the defendant.”159
The prejudice flowing from the chilling effect that SAMs inflict on
counsel’s performance is undeniable. The “defendant [is] deprived of the
ability to inform counsel of fertile investigative avenues to pursue without,
at the same time, also notifying the government,” potential witnesses will
remain unidentified, documents will go ignored, and “the entire defense
investigation of the case will be limited to those discovery materials pro-
duced by the government.”160
Finally, in today’s ever-connected world, attorneys frequently em-
ploy alternative forms of advocacy in order to zealously protect their cli-
ents’ interests and rights, and these tools are quickly becoming essential to
any competent defense attorney’s repertoire. For example, when activists
across the United States decided to call attention to Bradley Manning’s
cruel confinement conditions at Quantico, Manning’s lawyers helped
them by providing thorough accounts of his detention.161 Some of these
accounts were used to shed light on particularly inhumane aspects of Man-
ning’s confinement, like “being forced to sleep naked and stand naked for
morning parade . . . .”162 The lawyers’ accounts were also critical to chal-
lenging the Pentagon’s claims about Manning’s treatment.163
In contrast, “a particularly disturbing aspect of the [SAMs] is that
detailed exposition of [their impact] itself becomes illegal.”164 This pro-
scription is not limited to attorneys: “everyone in contact with a person
under SAMs, including lawyers and immediate family members, becomes
157. Interview with Joshua Dratel, supra note 117.
158. Dratel, supra note 49, at 90.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 33, at 1372.
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163. Id. at 1372–73.
164. Id. (citing United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d at 93, 93, 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2009)).
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subject to the SAMs by virtue of the requirement that they not divulge any
communication with that person to a third party.”165 The SAMs them-
selves “make it illegal to speak out publicly against the damage the SAMs
are having on the inmate.”166 SAMs not only have a chilling effect on a
defense attorney’s courtroom advocacy, but they also make it impossible
for an attorney to make the most of his client’s family, friends, and ac-
quaintances when preparing a defense.
In Hashmi’s case, for example, while it is true that the terms of his
SAMs technically allowed his attorney to disclose information to third par-
ties if it was for the “sole purpose of preparing [Hashmi’s] defense,” the
government—specifically opposing counsel—defined the scope of “what
might legitimately be included in this purpose.”167 The fact that the gov-
ernment enjoys sole discretion in determining when the SAMs have been
violated and whether the violation merits criminal prosecution keeps a
defense attorney in a sort of criminal purgatory, forcing him to constantly
question whether or not his actions will result in an indictment. Thus,
there is no way to avoid the chilling effect that SAMs have on a defense
attorney. The more intimidated and cautious a defense attorney becomes,
the less likely it is that he will satisfy Strickland’s performance standards and
fulfill the client’s right to the effective assistance of counsel.
CONCLUSION
When combined with pretrial detention, SAMs violate a defendant’s
Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial by depriving him of the opportunity
to meaningfully contribute to his own defense and to help his attorney
thoroughly investigate the case. Furthermore, SAMs also deprive a defen-
dant of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.
The SAMs’ monitoring regulation and threat of criminal prosecution work
together to have a substantial chilling effect on a defense counsel’s advo-
cacy, preventing him from pursuing all leads relevant to the case’s merits.
Although the government certainly has a strong interest in protecting the
public from individuals capable of perpetrating acts of violence or terror-
ism from behind bars, the government’s increased use of SAMs in terror-
ism prosecutions involving Arab and Muslim defendants who lack any
meaningful connection to terror organizations, history of crime, or pat-
terns of abusing third-party communications in detention offends the
Constitution.
Take Dzhokhar Tsarnaev’s SAMs, for example. Attorney General
Holder’s recent decision to impose SAMs on Tsarnaev is difficult to square
with the statutory requirements of 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 that the attorney
general must have reason to believe that a prisoner’s third-party communi-
165. Rovner & Theoharis, supra note 33, at 1371.
166. Id. at 1371–72.
167. Id. at 1372–73.
SPRING 2014] Special Administrative Measures and the War on Terror 441
cations or contacts pose a threat of death or serious bodily injury to
others.168 In Tsarnaev’s case, the government has provided “scant factual
support for its conclusory assertion that SAMs are required now, more
than four months into [Tsarnaev’s] already highly restrictive pretrial con-
finement, in order to protect others from ‘death or serious bodily in-
jury.’”169 According to his attorneys, “[t]he government has not alleged
that [Tsarnaev] has done or said anything since his arrest to commit vio-
lence, incite violence, or engage in communications that pose a security
threat.”170 Here, the government cited Tsarnaev’s alleged “participation in
planning and executing the Boston Marathon bombings; his ensuing acts
of violence and flight to avoid apprehension; his extensive obstruction of
justice; and his explicit and continuing desire to incite others to engage in
violent jihad” to justify his SAMs.171
However, similar to the government’s speculative determinations
about the substantial risks created by the third-party communications of
the defendants in El-Hage, Abu-Ali, and Hashmi, “notably absent in the
government’s litany [justifying Tsarnaev’s SAMs] is reference to any prob-
lematic behavior or efforts to incite others whatsoever in the months after
his arrest before SAMs were imposed.”172 Specifically, the fact that the
government has not alleged that the events for which Tsarnaev was ar-
rested “were directed by others still at large or that [Tsarnaev] ever had
operational authority to direct the activities of others” casts serious doubt
on the attorney general’s evidentiary basis for the SAMs.173
Additionally, no evidence appears to exist regarding the existence of
co-conspirators “with whom [Tsarnaev] could arrange further terrorist or
criminal activities, much less a ‘high probability’ that he would make calls
to do so, as alleged by the government.”174 In fact, one of the few specific
pieces of evidence cited by the government to justify its conclusions re-
garding the threat posed by Tsarnaev’s third-party communications is his
mother’s decision to publish portions of a recorded phone call with
Tsarnaev in a desperate attempt to create sympathy for him.175 However,
as Tsarnaev’s attorneys accurately pointed out, “[w]hile the government
168. See Motion to Vacate Special Administrative Measures (“SAMs”) Imposed on Defen-
dant and Defense Counsel at 2, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-CR-10200-GAO (D. Mass.
Oct. 2, 2013).
169. Id. at 1–2.
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171. Memorandum from Eric Holder, supra note 59, at 2.
172. Motion to Vacate Special Administrative Measures (“SAMs”) Imposed on Defendant
and Defense Counsel at 8, United States v. Tsarnaev, No. 13-CR-10200-GAO (D. Mass. Oct.
2, 2013).
173. Id. at 9.
174. Id. at 9.
175. Id. at 10.
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may not want anyone to feel ‘sympathy’ for [Tsarnaev, such a concern] is
not a proper basis to impose SAMs.”176
If the government continues imposing SAMs pretrial, it should im-
plement some critical procedural and substantive changes. First, the attor-
ney general’s authority to impose SAMs should be triggered only by a
finding of probable cause that any suspected terrorist may attempt to use
third-party communications to commit additional acts of terror or vio-
lence. Reasonable suspicion is simply too low of an evidentiary standard.
Additionally, the evidence upon which the attorney general makes his de-
termination should be explicitly delineated and made available to defense
counsel for review. If the evidence is of such a sensitive nature so as to
trigger key national security concerns, then it should be subject to in cam-
era review, and, where feasible, a closed evidentiary hearing.
Second, a terrorism defendant under SAMs should be able to chal-
lenge the measures’ evidentiary and legal basis before a federal judge with-
out having to first exhaust the BOP’s procedural remedies. As in the
context of FISA, district court judges are certainly equipped to evaluate
the strength of the Executive Branch’s discretionary decisions, particularly
those that implicate national security interests. A terrorism defendant and
his attorney have enough to worry about in preparing for the actual trial.
Obligating a defendant to exhaust all of the BOP’s administrative remedies
before he can challenge his SAMs in court serves no real interest except to
break the defendant’s spirit by forcing him to focus his time and energy on
ameliorating his pretrial confinement conditions.
There is no doubt that terrorism poses unique threats to our coun-
try’s overall security and to citizens’ personal safety. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible to prosecute suspected terrorists without depriving them of the ability
to assemble a meaningful defense or subjecting their attorneys to criminal
prosecution for what would otherwise constitute zealous representation.
The Constitution demands that we strike a balance between national se-
curity and civil liberties, and we should always strive to heed its call.
176. Id. at 10–11.




